more from Aristotle

Single Idea 10943

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition]

Full Idea

A what-it-was-to-be-that-thing only belongs to those things for whom an account just is a definition.

Clarification

An 'account' will be 'logos'

Gist of Idea

Essence only belongs to things whose account is a definition

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030a02)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.179


A Reaction

Kit Fine likes the idea of essential identity being pinned down by the act of definition. It strikes me that a unique definition may amount to a great deal less than a proper account.