more from David M. Armstrong

Single Idea 15753

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism]

Full Idea

A sophisticated Resemblance theory can appeal to the natures of the resembling things, from which the resemblances flow. The natures are suitably internal, but are as coarse as the things themselves (and perhaps are the things themselves).

Gist of Idea

Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], 1)

Book Reference

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.164


A Reaction

Note that this is essentialism as an underpinning for Resemblance Nominalism. His objection is that he just can't believe in essences, because they are too 'coarse' - which I take to mean that we cannot distinguish the boundaries of an essence.