more from Alexander Bird

Single Idea 9494

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation]

Full Idea

While singularists about causation might think that a particular has its causal powers independently of law, it is difficult to see how a universal could have or confer causal powers without generating what we would naturally think of as a law.

Gist of Idea

Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws


Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 4.2.1 n71)

Book Reference

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.71

A Reaction

This is a middle road between the purely singularist account (Anscombe) and the fully nomological account. We might say that a caused event will be 'involved in law-like behaviour', without attributing the cause to a law.