more from David Bostock

Single Idea 18136

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism]

Full Idea

If we accept the initial idea that we can think only of what we ourselves can describe, then something like the theory of predicativism quite naturally results

Gist of Idea

If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied

Source

David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3)

Book Reference

Bostock,David: 'Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction' [Wiley-Blackwell 2009], p.252


A Reaction

I hate the idea that we can only talk of what falls under a sortal, but 'what we can describe' is much more plausible. Whether or not you agree with this approach (I'm pondering it), this makes predicativism important.

Related Ideas

Idea 18139 The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock]

Idea 18151 Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]