more from David O. Brink

Single Idea 2850

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism]

Full Idea

It is not clear how the emotivist can accommodate the amoralist - one who recognises moral requirements but is indifferent to them.

Gist of Idea

How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it?

Source

David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)

Book Reference

'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy', ed/tr. Audi,Robert [CUP 1995], p.224


A Reaction

Nietzsche recognised current morals, but was indifferent to them. It is hard to imagine, though, an amoralist who lacked all the feelings which imply morality.