more from David J.Chalmers

Single Idea 14713

[catalogued under 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth]

Full Idea

The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent.

Gist of Idea

Truth in a scenario is the negation with that scenario being a priori incoherent


David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [], p.25

A Reaction

See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way.