more from David J.Chalmers

Single Idea 16424

[catalogued under 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity]

Full Idea

The hypothesized modality of 'strong' metaphysical necessity says there are fewer metaphysically possible worlds than there are logically possible worlds, and the a posteriori necessities can stem from factors independent of the semantics of terms.

Gist of Idea

Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity


David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.4.2)

Book Reference

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.137

A Reaction

Chalmers sets this up in order to reject it. He notes that it involves a big gap between conceivability and possibility. If a world is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, then it is impossible, surely?