more from David J.Chalmers

Single Idea 2413

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies]

Full Idea

The explanation of my zombie twin's claims does not depend on consciousness, as there is none in his world. It follows that the explanation of my claims is also independent of the existence of consciousness.

Gist of Idea

If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness


David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.5.2)

Book Reference

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.180

A Reaction

Epiphenomenalism says my accounts of my consciousness are NOT because of my consciousness (which seems daft). Chalmers here gives a very good reason why we should not be a friend of philosophical zombies.