more from Jonathan Dancy

Single Idea 5682

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism]

Full Idea

Indirect realism holds that in perception we are indirectly aware of the physical objects around us in virtue of a direct awareness of internal, non-physical objects.

Clarification

'Indirect realism' is representative realism

Gist of Idea

Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.4)

Book Reference

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.152


A Reaction

This may be a slightly prejudicial definition which invites insoluble questions about the ontological status of the internal 'objects'. It seems to me obvious that we create some sort of inner 'models' or constructions in the process of perception.