more from Michael Devitt

Single Idea 17369

[catalogued under 27. Natural Reality / F. Biology / 5. Species]

Full Idea

Our explanatory purposes in introducing a name for a species demand that we draw the lines around a group that is small enough to share a whole lot of important properties and large enough to yield broad generalizations.

Gist of Idea

We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations

Source

Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 10 'Arb')

Book Reference

Devitt,Michael: 'Putting Metaphysics First' [OUP 2010], p.243


A Reaction

Grist to my mill. In this reaction slot (16th Oct 2013) I launch my new metaphysical school - welcome to EXPLANATIONISM! Folk metaphysics, and the best philosophical metaphysics, is entirely driven by the needs of explanation.