more from Curt Ducasse

Single Idea 8372

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation]

Full Idea

The part of a generalization concerning what is common to one individual concrete event and the causes of certain other events of the same kind is involved in the mere assigning of a name to the cause and its effect, but not in the perceiving them.

Gist of Idea

We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them

Source

Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], 5)

Book Reference

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.134


A Reaction

A nice point, that we should keep distinct the recognition of a cause, and the assigning of a general name to it. Ducasse is claiming that we can directly perceive singular causation.