more from Catherine Z. Elgin

Single Idea 8617

[catalogued under 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence]

Full Idea

The best explanation of coherence (where the components of a coherent account must be mutually consistent, cotenable and supportive) is that the account is at least roughly true.

Gist of Idea

Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true


Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.158)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.158

A Reaction

Note that she is NOT employing a coherence account of truth (which I take to be utterly wrong). It is notoriously difficult to define coherence. If the components must be 'tenable', they have epistemic status apart from their role in coherence.