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Single Idea 5444

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence]

Full Idea

The new essentialism retains Aristotelian ideas about essential properties, but it distinguishes more clearly between 'individual essences' and 'kind essences'; the former define a particular individual, the latter what kind it belongs to.

Gist of Idea

'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to

Source

Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1)

Book Reference

Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.12


A Reaction

This might actually come into conflict with Aristotle, who seems to think that my personal essence is largely a human nature I share with everyone else. The new distinction is trying to keep the Kantian individual on the stage.