more from R Feldman / E Conee

Single Idea 8810

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge]

Full Idea

If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory.

Gist of Idea

If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge


R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III)

Book Reference

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.173

A Reaction

This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant.