more from Kit Fine

Single Idea 11175

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives]

Full Idea

The nature of the logical concepts is given, not by certain logical truths, but by certain logical inferences. What properly belongs to disjunction is the inference from p to (p or q), rather than the fact that p implies (p or q).

Gist of Idea

Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications

Source

Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], 3)

Book Reference

'Modality, Morality and Belief', ed/tr. Sinnott-Armstrong/Raffman/Asher [CUP 1995], p.58


A Reaction

Does this mean that Fine is wickedly starting with the psychology, rather than with the pure truth of the connection? Frege is shuddering. This view seems to imply that the truth table for 'or' is secondary.