Full Idea
I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
Clarification
'Hylomorphism' is Aristotle's notion of some matter with a form
Gist of Idea
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts)
Source
Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
Book Reference
-: 'Midwest Studs in Philosophy' [-], p.62
A Reaction
[see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
Related Ideas
Idea 13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
Idea 13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]