more from Jennifer Fisher

Single Idea 8941

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility]

Full Idea

Explaining 'it is possible that p' by saying p is true in at least one possible world doesn't get me very far. If I don't understand what possibility is, then appealing to possible worlds is not going to do me much good.

Gist of Idea

We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds


Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 06.III)

Book Reference

Fisher,Jennifer: 'On the Philosophy of Logic' [Thomson Wadsworth 2008], p.84

A Reaction

This seems so blatant that I assume friends of possible worlds will have addressed the problem. Note that you will also need to understand 'possible' to define necessity as 'true in all possible worlds'. Necessarily-p is not-possibly-not-p.