more from Owen Flanagan

Single Idea 5342

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism]

Full Idea

One may be committed to the truth of physicalism without being committed to the claim that the essence of an experience is captured fully by a description of its neural realiser.

Gist of Idea

Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser


Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 90)

Book Reference

Flanagan,Owen: 'The Problem of the Soul' [Basic Books 2003], p.90

A Reaction

This is a reply to the Leibniz Mill question (idea 2109) about what is missing from a materialist view. Flanagan's point is that just as the essence of a panorama is the view from the hill, so the essence of consciousness requires you to be that brain.

Related Idea

Idea 2109 Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]