more from Graeme Forbes

Single Idea 12028

[catalogued under 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts]

Full Idea

De re necessity does not differ from de dicto necessity in respect of how it arises: it is still a form of conceptual necessity.

Gist of Idea

De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is


Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4)

Book Reference

Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.232

A Reaction

[Forbes proceeds to argue for this claim] Forbes defends a form of essentialism, but takes the necessity to arise from a posteriori truths because of the a priori involvement of other concepts (rather as Kripke argues).

Related Idea

Idea 13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]