more from Gottlob Frege

Single Idea 10533

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals]

Full Idea

Frege is denying that on a traditional basis we can construct a workable semantics for a language; we can't regard terms like 'wisdom' as standing for the very same thing as the predicate 'x is wise' stands for.

Gist of Idea

We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing


report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14

Book Reference

Dummett,Michael: 'Frege Philosophy of Language' [Duckworth 1981], p.472

A Reaction

This follows from Idea 10532, indicating how to deal with the problem of universals. So predicates refer to concepts, and singular terms to objects. But I see no authoritative way of deciding which is which, given that paraphrases are possible.

Related Idea

Idea 10532 We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]