more from Gottlob Frege

Single Idea 10539

[catalogued under 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete]

Full Idea

Frege employs the notion of 'concrete' (wirklich, literally 'actual') objects, in arguing that not every object is concrete, but it does not work; abstract objects are just as much objects as concrete ones.

Gist of Idea

Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones


report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], 26,85) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14

Book Reference

Dummett,Michael: 'Frege Philosophy of Language' [Duckworth 1981], p.480

A Reaction

See Idea 10516 for why Dummett is keen on the distinction. Frege strikes me as being wildly irresponsible about ontology.

Related Ideas

Idea 10516 A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]

Idea 14002 Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]