more from Gottlob Frege

Single Idea 9580

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism]

Full Idea

The bringing of an object under a concept is merely the recognition of a relation which previously already obtained, [but in the abstractionist view] objects are essentially changed by the process, so that objects brought under a concept become similar.

Gist of Idea

Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them


Gottlob Frege (Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' [1894], p.324)

Book Reference

-: 'Mind July 1972' [-], p.324

A Reaction

Frege's view would have to account for occasional misapplications of concepts, like taking a dolphin to be a fish, or falsely thinking there is someone in the cellar.