more from Gottlob Frege

Single Idea 9584

[catalogued under 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental]

Full Idea

The relation of sameness remains puzzling to a psychological logician. They cannot say 'A is the same as B', because that requires distinguishing A from B, so that these would have to be different presentations.

Gist of Idea

Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them

Source

Gottlob Frege (Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' [1894], p.327)

Book Reference

-: 'Mind July 1972' [-], p.327


A Reaction

This is why Frege needed the concept of reference, so that identity could be outside the mind (as in Hesperus = Phosophorus). Think about an electron; now think about a different electron.