more from Bob Hale

Single Idea 12435

[catalogued under 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity]

Full Idea

My claim is that there are non-transitive explanations of necessities, where what explains is indeed necessary, but what explains the necessity of the explanandum is not the explanation's necessity, but its truth simpliciter.


The 'explanandum' is the thing to be explained

Gist of Idea

The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth)


Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.311)

Book Reference

-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.311

A Reaction

The big idea is to avoid a regress of necessities. The actual truths he proposes are essentialist. An interesting proposal. It might depend on how one views essences (as giving identity, or causal power)