more from Bob Hale

Single Idea 19289

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention]

Full Idea

An old objection to conventionalism claims that it confuses sentences with propositions, confusing what makes sentences mean what they do with what makes them (as propositions) true.

Gist of Idea

Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed


Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 05.2)

Book Reference

Hale,Bob: 'Necessary Beings' [OUP 2013], p.120

A Reaction

The conventions would presumably apply to the sentences, but not to the propositions. Since I think that focusing on propositions solves a lot of misunderstandings in modern philosophy, I like the sound of this.