more from Bob Hale

Single Idea 8261

[catalogued under 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity]

Full Idea

It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute.

Gist of Idea

Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute


Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.16

A Reaction

Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary.