more from B Hale / C Wright

Single Idea 10627

[catalogued under 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths]

Full Idea

There are many statements which are plausibly viewed as conceptual truths (such as 'what is yellow is extended') which do not qualify as analytic under Frege's definition (as provable using only logical laws and definitions).

Gist of Idea

Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions

Source

B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2)

Book Reference

Hale,B/Wright,C: 'The Reason's Proper Study' [OUP 2003], p.12


A Reaction

Presumably this is because the early assumptions of Frege were mathematical and logical, and he was trying to get away from Kant. That yellow is extended is a truth for non-linguistic beings.