more from B Hale / C Wright

Single Idea 10629

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique]

Full Idea

The relativization of ontology to theory in structuralism can't avoid carrying with it a relativization of truth-value, which would compromise the objectivity which structuralists wish to claim for mathematics.

Gist of Idea

If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity

Source

B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2 n26)

Book Reference

Hale,B/Wright,C: 'The Reason's Proper Study' [OUP 2003], p.15


A Reaction

This is the attraction of structures which grow out of the physical world, where truth-value is presumably not in dispute.