Full Idea
The power of particulars are always made understandable by the natures of those particulars, but finally such explanations come to rest with a power of a particular that has no explanation in the nature of that thing or bit of material.
Gist of Idea
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.VII)
Book Reference
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.154
A Reaction
I'm glad they faced up to this matter. The question is whether the fundamental powers which are the terminus of explanation are the same sort of thing as the powers which were said to be the target for explanations. Just complex powers?