more from Katherine Hawley

Single Idea 14492

[catalogued under 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object]

Full Idea

The constitution theorists, who claim that the sweater and the thread are different things, should offer some explanation of why we tend to say that there is just one thing there. They must simply claim that we 'do not count by identity'.

Gist of Idea

If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?


Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 5.8)

Book Reference

Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.163

A Reaction

Her example is a sweater knitted from a single piece of thread. Presumably we could count by sortal identity, so there is one thread here, and there is one sweater here. We just can't add the two together. No ontological arithmetic.