more from John Hawthorne

Single Idea 19554

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure]

Full Idea

How could we know that P and Q but not be in a position to know that P (as deniers of closure must say)? If my glass is full of wine, we know 'g is full of wine, and not full of non-wine'. How can we deny that we know it is not full of non-wine?

Gist of Idea

Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases


John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.45

A Reaction

Hawthorne merely raises this doubt. Dretske is concerned with heavyweight implications, but how do you accept lightweight implications like this one, and then suddenly reject them when they become too heavy? [see p.49]