more from John Heil

Single Idea 4618

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation]

Full Idea

If a mental property is realised by a material property, then it looks as though its material realiser pre-empts any causal contribution on the part of the realised mental property.

Gist of Idea

If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind


John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.198

A Reaction

This has a beautiful simplicity about it. I can see how some very odd phenomena might suddenly appear out of a physical combination, but not how entirely new causal laws can be created.