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Single Idea 4626

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories]

Full Idea

The prevailing 'externalist' line on intentionality regards intentional states of mind as owing their content (what they are of, or about) to causal relations agents bear to the world.

Gist of Idea

The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world


John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.215

A Reaction

This goes back to Putnam's Twin Earth. 'Meanings aren't in the head'. I may defer to experts about what 'elm' means, but I may also be arrogantly wrong about what 'juniper' means.