more from John Heil

Single Idea 7051

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities]

Full Idea

Secondary qualities are not distinct from primary qualities: an object's possession of a given secondary quality is a matter of its possession of certain complex primary qualities.

Gist of Idea

Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities

Source

John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 17.3)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.200


A Reaction

The bottom line here is that, if essentialism is right, colours are not properties at all (see Idea 5456). Heil wants to subsume secondary properties within primary properties. I think we should sharply distinguish them.

Related Idea

Idea 5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]