more from Thomas Hofweber

Single Idea 17990

[catalogued under 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth]

Full Idea

A standard objection to minimalist truth is the 'incompleteness objection'. Since there are propositions inexpressible in present English the concept of truth isn't captured by all the instances of the Tarski biconditional.

Clarification

The Tarksi biconditional is "'P' is true iff P"

Gist of Idea

Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 5.3)

Book Reference

'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.2', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2006], p.195


A Reaction

Sounds like a good objection.