more from Frank Jackson

Single Idea 14635

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties]

Full Idea

On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears.

Gist of Idea

An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears


Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6)

Book Reference

'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.261

A Reaction

There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'!