Full Idea
We typically count things as red just if they have a property that interacts with normal human beings to make the object look red in such a way that their so looking counts as a presentation of the property to normal humans.
Gist of Idea
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
Source
Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4)
Book Reference
Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.97
A Reaction
This is Jackson's careful statement of the 'Australian' primary property view of colours. He is trying to make red a real property of objects, but personally I take the mention of 'normal' humans as a huge danger sign. Nice try, but no. See Idea 5456.
Related Idea
Idea 5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]