more from Jonathan D. Jacobs

Single Idea 12464

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds]

Full Idea

Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver.

Gist of Idea

If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible

Source

Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3)

Book Reference

-: 'Philosophical Studies' [-], p.7


A Reaction

This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different.