more from Jaegwon Kim

Single Idea 3389

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia]

Full Idea

If inverted qualia, or absent qualia (zombies), are possible in functionally equivalent systems, qualia are not capturable by functional definitions.

Gist of Idea

Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional


Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.114)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.114

A Reaction

The point here (I take it) is that we don't have to go the whole hog of saying the qualia are therefore epiphenomenal, although that is implied. How about a fail-safe situation, where qualia do it for me, and something else does the same for zombies?