more from Jaegwon Kim

Single Idea 3438

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument]

Full Idea

For the reductionist, no new causal powers emerge at higher levels, which goes against the claims of the emergentist and the non-reductive physicalist.

Gist of Idea

Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level


Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.232)

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.232

A Reaction

I would say that all higher level causes are simply the sums of lower level causes, as in chemistry and physics. What could possibly produced the power at the higher level, apart from the constituents of the thing? Magic?