more from Philip Kitcher

Single Idea 20473

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility]

Full Idea

According to Kitcher, if experiential evidence can defeat someone's justification for a belief, then their justification depends on the absence of that experiential evidence.

Gist of Idea

If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence

Source

report of Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], p.89) by Albert Casullo - A Priori Knowledge 2.3

Book Reference

'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.105


A Reaction

Sounds implausible. There are trillions of possible defeaters for most beliefs, but to say they literally depend on trillions of absences seems a very odd way of seeing the situation