more from U Kriegel / K Williford

Single Idea 9314

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought]

Full Idea

A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.

Gist of Idea

Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error

Source

U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], 1)

Book Reference

'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.2


A Reaction

It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.