Full Idea
If a Gödelian fraud were exposed, Gödel would no longer be called 'the author of the incompleteness theorem', but he would still be called 'Gödel'. The description, therefore, does not abbreviate the name.
Gist of Idea
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 37)
Book Reference
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.87
A Reaction
Clearly we can't make the description a necessary fact about Gödel, but that doesn't invalidate the idea that successful reference needs some description. E.g. Gödel is a person.
Related Idea
Idea 17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]