more from Gottfried Leibniz

Single Idea 12706

[catalogued under 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier]

Full Idea

Every substance is indivisible and consequently every corporeal substance must have a soul or at least an entelechy which is analogous to the soul, since otherwise bodies would be no more than phenomena.

Clarification

An 'entelechy' is what makes something actual, or perfect, not merely potential

Gist of Idea

Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], G II 121), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2

Book Reference

Garber,Daniel: 'Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad' [OUP 2009], p.88


A Reaction

There is a large gap between having 'a soul' and having something 'analogous to a soul'. I take the analogy to be merely as originators of action. Leibniz wants to add appetite and sensation to the Aristotelian forms (but knows this is dubious!).