more from Joseph Levine

Single Idea 7878

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap]

Full Idea

We cannot give materialist explanations of why brain yields phenomenal properties because phenomenal concepts are not associated with descriptions of causal roles in the same way as pre-theoretical terms in other areas of science.

Gist of Idea

Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles


comment on Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.143

A Reaction

I think Papineau has part of the answer, and I certainly like his notion of Conceptual Dualism, but if qualia are physical, there must be a physical account of how they acquire their properties. I think the whole brain needs to be understood first.