more from E.J. Lowe

Single Idea 6622

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism]

Full Idea

The rejection of type-type identity and acceptance of token-token identity is referred to as 'non-reductive physicalism', and is usually link with the idea that mental state types are not identical with physical state types, but 'supervene' on them.

Clarification

Token-token says all mental events have brain events; type-type adds that they must always be of the same type

Gist of Idea

Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.49


A Reaction

A nice summary of the view (built on the arguments of Davidson) which has also become known as 'property dualism'. Personally I regard it as dangerous nonsense. If two things 'supervene' on one another, the first question to ask is: why?