more from E.J. Lowe

Single Idea 8316

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts]

Full Idea

There is a difficulty for any view of facts which sees them as being wholly abstract entities, and yet also being causal relata; for it seems that only concrete entities, existing in time and space, can enter into causal relations.

Gist of Idea

Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.234


A Reaction

There seems a lot of ambiguity in the air here, between epistemology and ontology (surprise!). I take causation to be a physical activity in the concrete world. Our understanding of it is expressed with abstractions. 'Fact' seems to have two meanings.