more from Christopher Peacocke

Single Idea 18571

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy]

Full Idea

Peacocke's method for discovering the possession conditions of concepts is committed to a specific account of counterfactual judgements - the Simulation Model (judgements we'd make if the antecedent were actual).

Gist of Idea

Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals

Source

report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2.3.4

Book Reference

Machery,Edouard: 'Doing Without Concepts' [OUP 2009], p.45


A Reaction

Machery concludes that the Simulation Model is incorrect. This appears to be Edgington's theory of conditionals, though Machery doesn't mention her.

Related Idea

Idea 13854 Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]