more from C.B. Martin

Single Idea 15468

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation]

Full Idea

'Causal' counterfactuals have a place, of course, but only as clumsy and inexact linguistic gestures to dispositions, and they should be kept in that place.

Gist of Idea

Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions

Source

C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.6)

Book Reference

Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.19


A Reaction

Counterfactuals only seem to give a regularity account of causation, by correlating an effect with a minimal context which will give rise to it. Surely dispositions run deeper than that?