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Single Idea 6075

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact]

Full Idea

A fact may be an object and an extension (Quine's view), or a property and a set of properties, or an object and a property; the view I favour is the third one, which seems the most natural.

Clarification

The 'extension' is the set of objects which qualify

Gist of Idea

Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3)

Book Reference

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.63


A Reaction

Personally I tend to use the word 'fact' in a realist and non-linguistic way. There must be innumerable inexpressible facts, such as the single pattern made by all the particles of the universe. McGinn seems to be talking of 'atomic facts'. See Idea 6111.

Related Idea

Idea 6111 As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]